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Why Mathematics Works So Well 
Noson S. Yanofsky 
A major question in philosophy of science involves the unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics in physics. Why should mathematics, created or discovered, with nothing 
empirical in mind be so perfectly suited to describe the laws of the physical universe? We 
review the well-known fact that the symmetries of the laws of physics are their defining 
properties. We show that there are similar symmetries of mathematical facts and that 
these symmetries are the defining properties of mathematics. By examining the 
symmetries of physics and mathematics, we show that the effectiveness is actually quite 
reasonable. In essence, we show that the regularities of physics are a subset of the 
regularities of mathematics.  
Introduction.  
One of the most interesting problems in philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics is 
concerned with the relationship between the laws of physics and the world of mathematics. Why should 
mathematics so perfectly describe the workings of the universe? Significant areas of mathematics are 
formed without anything physical in mind, and yet such mathematics can be used to describe the laws of 
physics. How are we to understand this?  
This mystery is seen most clearly by examining the power of mathematics to determine the existence of 
physical objects before there is empirical evidence of those objects. One of the more famous examples of 
the predictive abilities of mathematics is the discovery of Neptune by Urbain Le Verrier simply by 
making some calculation about the abnormalities of the orbit of Uranus. Other examples are P.A.M. 
Dirac’s prediction of the existence of positrons and James Clerk Maxwell’s extrapolation that varying 
electric or magnetic fields should generate propagating waves.  
Even more amazing is that there existed entire established fields of mathematics long before physicists 
realized that they were useful for understanding various aspects of the physical universe. The conic 
sections studied by Apollonius in ancient Greece were used by Johannes Kepler in the beginning of the 
seventeenth century to understand the orbits of the planets. Complex numbers were invented several 
centuries before physicists started using them to describe quantum mechanics. Non-Euclidian geometry 
was developed decades before it was used in an essential way for general relativity. (Details of these and 
other remarkable mathematical discoveries can be found in [Yan].) 
Why should mathematics be so good at describing the world? Of all thoughts, ideas, or ways of 
expressing things, why should mathematics work so well? What about other modes of thought? Why does 
poetry fail to describe the exact movements of the celestial bodies? Why can’t music capture the full 
complexity of the periodic table? Why is meditation not very helpful in predicting the outcomes of 
experiments in quantum mechanics?  
The problem of why mathematics works so well was famously addressed by Nobel prize winning 
physicist Eugene Wigner in a paper titled “The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural 
sciences” [Wigner1]. Wigner did not arrive at any definitive answers to the questions. He wrote that “the 
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enormous usefulness of mathematics in the natural sciences is something bordering on the mysterious and 
… there is no rational explanation for it.”  
Albert Einstein perfectly described the mystery as follows: 
How can it be that mathematics, being after all a product of human thought which is 
independent of experience, is so admirably appropriate to the objects of reality? Is human 
reason, then, without experience, merely by taking thought, able to fathom the properties 
of real things? [Einstein] 
To be clear, the problem really arises when one considers both physics and mathematics to each be 
perfectly formed, objective and independent of human observers. With such a conception, one can ask 
why these two independent disciplines harmonize so well. Why is it that that an independently discovered 
law of physics can be described perfectly by (already discovered) mathematics?     
Many researchers have pondered this mystery and offered various solutions to the problem. Theologians 
solve the mystery by positing a Being who perfectly set up the laws of the universe and used the language 
of mathematics to describe these laws. However the existence of such a Being only adds to the mystery of 
the universe. Platonists (and their cousins Realists) believe that there exists some realm of “perfect 
Forms” which contains all mathematical objects, structures and truths. In addition, this “Platonic attic” 
also contains the physical laws. The problem with Platonism is that, in order to explain the relationship 
between our mathematical world and the physical universe, it invokes yet another Platonic world. Now 
one must explain the relationship between all three of these worlds. Other questions also arise: are 
imperfect mathematical theorems also a perfect Form? Do outdated laws of physics also reside in Plato’s 
attic?  Who set up this world of perfect Forms?  
The reason most cited (see [Mickens]) to answer the unreasonable effectiveness is that we learn 
mathematics by examining the physical universe. We understood some of the properties of addition and 
multiplication by counting stones and sheep. We learned geometry by looking at physical shapes. From 
this point of view, it is not a surprise that physics follows mathematics since the mathematics that we 
know was formed by scrutinizing the physical world. The main problem with this solution is that 
mathematics is very useful in areas distant from human perception. Why is the hidden world of subatomic 
particles so perfectly described by a mathematics learned by observing stones and sheep? Why is special 
relativity, which deals with objects that move near the speed of light, described by a mathematics that was 
learned by watching objects that move at normal speeds?  
While these and other purported solutions to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics have some 
merit, the mystery still remains. In two recent papers [YanZel1,YanZel2], Mark Zelcer and I have 
formulated a novel view of the nature of mathematics. We show that just as symmetry plays an important 
role in physics, so too, symmetry plays a major role in mathematics. This view of mathematics supplies 
an original solution to the unreasonable effectiveness problem.  
 
What is physics? 
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Before we can contemplate the reason why mathematics describes physical laws so well, we have to be 
exact as to the definition of a physical law. To say that a physical law describes a physical phenomenon is 
a bit naïve. It is much more. As a first attempt we might say that each law describes many different 
physical phenomena. For example, the law of gravity describes what happens when I drop my spoon; it 
describes what happens when I drop my spoon tomorrow; and it describes what happens if I drop my 
spoon on the planet Saturn next month. A law of physics describes a whole bundle of many different 
phenomena. However this definition is not enough. A single physical phenomenon can be perceived in 
many different ways. One can perceive a phenomenon while remaining stationary at the same time as 
another perceives the same phenomenon while moving (in a uniform constant frame, or an accelerating 
frame). Physics states that no matter how a single phenomenon is perceived, it should be described by a 
single physical law. We conclude that a physical law describes a whole bundle of perceived physical 
phenomena. For example, the law of gravity describes my observation of a spoon falling in a speeding car 
while I am in the car; a stationary friend’s observation of a spoon falling in a speeding car; an observation 
by someone standing on his head near a black hole of a falling spoon in a speeding car on Saturn, etc. 
Every physical law describes a large bundle of perceived physical phenomena.   
The question then arises as how to classify all perceived physical phenomena into different laws or which 
perceived physical phenomena should be bound up together. Physicists use the notion of symmetry for 
this. Colloquially the word “symmetry” is used to describe physical objects. We say a room has symmetry 
if the left side of the room is the same as the right side of the room. In other words, if we swap the 
furnishings from one side to the other, the room would look the same. Scientists have extended this 
definition of symmetry to describe physical laws. A physical law is symmetric with respect to a type of 
translation if the law still describes the translated phenomenon. For example, physical laws are symmetric 
with respect to location. This means that if an experiment is done in Pisa or Princeton, the results of the 
experiment are the same. The phenomenon occurring in Pisa is bundled up with the phenomenon 
occurring in Princeton. Physical laws are also symmetric with respect to time, i.e., performing the same 
experiment today or tomorrow should give us the same result. In terms of bundles, that means that all 
experiments performed at any time are bundled up to be in the same class of perceived physical 
phenomena. Another obvious symmetry is orientation. If you change the orientation of an experiment, the 
results of the experiment remain the same. The languages of bundles of perceived physical phenomena 
and of symmetries of physical laws are equivalent. In this paper we employ both languages.  
There are many other types of symmetries that physical laws have to obey. Galilean relativity demands 
that the laws of motion remain unchanged if a phenomenon is observed while stationary or moving at a 
uniform, constant velocity. Special relativity states that the laws of motion must remain the same even if 
the observers are moving close to the speed of light. General relativity states that the laws are invariant 
even if the observer is moving in an accelerating frame.  
Physicists have generalized the notion of symmetry in many different ways: gauge transformations, local 
symmetries, global symmetries, continuous symmetries, discrete symmetries, etc. Victor Stenger 
[Stenger] unites the many different types of symmetries under what he calls point of view invariance. 
That is, all the laws of physics must remain the same regardless of how they are viewed. He demonstrates 
how much ---but not all--- of modern physics can be recast as laws that satisfy point of view invariance. 
This means that different perceived physical phenomena are bundled together if they are related to the 
same physical phenomenon but are perceived from different points of view.  
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The real importance of symmetry came when Einstein formulated the laws of special relativity. Prior to 
him, one first found a law of nature and then found its symmetries. In contrast, Einstein used the 
symmetries to discover the laws. In order to find the laws of special relativity, he posited that the laws 
must be the same for a stationary observer and an observer moving close to speed of light. Given this 
presupposition, he went on to formulate the equations that describe special relativity. This was 
revolutionary. Einstein had realized that symmetries are the defining characteristics of laws of physics. It 
is not that physical laws satisfy symmetries. Rather, whatever satisfies symmetries is a physical law.  
In 1918, Emmy Noether showed that symmetry is even more central to physics. She proved a celebrated 
theorem that connected symmetry to conservation laws that permeate physics. The theorem states that for 
every symmetry of a special type there exists a conservation law and vice versa. For example, the fact that 
the laws of physics are invariant with respect to translations in space corresponds to conservation of linear 
momentum. Time invariance corresponds to conservation of energy. Orientation invariance corresponds 
to conservation of angular momentum. Equipped with the understanding given by Einstein and Noether of 
the centrality of symmetry, physicists have been searching for novel and different types of symmetries in 
order to find new laws of physics.   
With this broad definition of physical law, it is not hard to see why the laws have a feeling of being 
objective, timeless and independent of human observations. Since the laws are applied in every place, at 
every time, and from every perspective, they have a feeling of being “out there.” However one need not 
look at it that way. Rather than saying that we are looking at many different instances of an external 
physical law, we may say that we humans select those perceived physical phenomena that have some type 
of regularity and bundle them together to form a single physical law. We act like a sieve that picks and 
chooses from all the physical phenomena that we perceive, we bundle together what is the same physical 
law, and we ignore the rest. We cannot eliminate the human element in understanding the laws of nature.  
Before we proceed, we must mention a symmetry that is so obvious it has not been articulated. A law of 
physics must satisfy symmetry of applicability. That is, if a law works for a particular physical object of a 
certain type then it will work for another physical object of the same type. For example, if a law is true for 
one positively charged subatomic particle moving at close to the speed of light, then it will work for 
another positively charged subatomic particle that is also moving at close to the speed of light. In contrast, 
that law might not work for a macroscopic object moving at a slow speed. All of these different perceived 
physical phenomena will be bundled together as one law. Symmetry of applicability will be of 
fundamental importance when we discuss the relationship of physics to mathematics. 
 
What is mathematics? 
Let us spend a few minutes considering the real essence of mathematics. We illustrate with three 
examples.  
Long ago a farmer realized that if you take nine apples and combine them with four apples, there will be 
thirteen apples. Not long after that it was noticed that if nine oranges are combined with four oranges, 
there will be thirteen oranges. That is, if you swap every apple for an orange, the amount of fruit remains 
the same. At some point an early mathematician looked at many instances of this and bundled them 
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together to summarize with the mathematical expression 9 + 4 = 13. This pithy little statement 
encapsulates all the instances of this type of combination. This expression will be true for any whole 
discrete object that can be exchanged for apples.  
On a more sophisticated level, a major theorem in algebraic geometry is Hilbert's Nullstellensatz which is 
essential for understanding the relationship between ideals in polynomial rings and algebraic sets. For 
every ideal 𝐽 in a polynomial ring there is a related algebraic set, 𝑉(𝐽), and for every algebraic set S there 
is an ideal I(S).  The relationship between these two operations is given as follows: for every ideal 𝐽 we 
have 𝐼(𝑉(𝐽)) = √𝐽 where √𝐽 is the radical of the ideal. If we change one ideal for another ideal, we get a 
different algebraic set. If we swap one algebraic set for another, we get a different ideal. Essentially, the 
bundling together of all the different instances of this law is Hilbert’s theorem.  
 
One of the basic ideas in algebraic topology is the Hurewicz homomorphism. For any topological space 𝑋 
and positive integer 𝑘 there exists a group homomorphism from the 𝑘-th homotopy group to the 𝑘-th 
homology group ℎ∗: 𝜋𝑘(𝑋) → 𝐻𝑘(𝑋). This homomorphism has special properties depending on the space 
𝑋 and the integer 𝑘. If the space 𝑋 is swapped for space 𝑌 and 𝑘 is exchanged for 𝑘′ there will be another 
group homomorphism 𝜋𝑘′(𝑌) → 𝐻𝑘′(𝑌). Once again, no single instance of the statement has any 
mathematical content. Rather, it is the realization that all the instances of the statement can be bundled 
together that makes this mathematics.  
In these three examples, we focused on changing the semantics of the mathematical statements. We 
exchanged oranges for apples. We swapped one ideal for another. We replaced one topological space for 
a different one. Our main point is that when you make the appropriate changes, the mathematical facts 
remain true. We claim that this ability to alter the semantics of a mathematical statement is the defining 
property of mathematics. That is, a statement is mathematics if we can swap what it refers to and remain 
true. 
Associated with every mathematical statement is a class of entities called the domain of discourse for that 
statement. The statement is stating something about all the elements of this domain of discourse. When a 
mathematician says “For any integer 𝑛…,” “Take a Hausdorff space..,” or “Let C be a cocommutative 
coassociative coalgebra with an involution…,” she is setting up the domain of discourse for that 
statement. If the statement is true for some element in the domain of discourse, it is true for any other. 
Notice that for a statement the domain of discourse can consist of many types of entities.  
This swapping of one element in the domain of discourse for another can be seen as a type of symmetry. 
If you swap one referent for another referent within the domain of discourse, the fact will remain true. We 
call this symmetry of semantics. Mathematics is invariant with respect to symmetry of semantics. We are 
claiming that this type of symmetry is as fundamental to mathematics as symmetry is to physics. In the 
same way that physicists formulate laws, mathematicians formulate mathematical statements by 
determining which bundle of ideas satisfies symmetry of semantics. We go further than just saying that 
mathematical truths satisfy symmetry of semantics. Rather, anything that satisfies symmetry of semantics, 
is mathematics. 
The logicians among us will find symmetry of semantics to be a familiar notion. They call a logical 
statement valid if it is true for every element of the domain of discourse. Here we are saying that a 
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statement satisfies symmetry of semantics if we can exchange any element of its intended domain of 
discourse with any other element of its domain of discourse. The novelty we are expressing here is that 
validity can be seen as a form of symmetry and that this symmetry is the defining feature of mathematics.  
One might object to this definition of mathematics as being too broad and say that what we are defining is 
any general statement. The argument would be that statements that satisfy symmetry of semantics are not 
just mathematical statements but any general statement. There is a two-prong defense to this criticism. 
First, modern mathematics is very broad. Mathematics is not just about numbers and quantities. Looking 
at modern mathematics one finds shapes, propositions, sets, categories, microstates, macrostates, 
qualities, etc. In order to deal with all these objects, our definition of mathematics needs to be broad. A 
second defense is that there are many general statements that do not satisfy symmetry of semantics. “It is 
cold in New York during the month of January,” “Flowers are red and green,” and “Senators are honest 
people” are general statements but do not satisfy symmetry of semantics and hence are not mathematical.  
As long as there are any counterexamples to such statements within their implied domain of discourse, 
they may be general, but they are not mathematical. The fact that symmetry of semantics does not permit 
any counterexamples within the domain of discourse implies a certain precision of thought and language 
which people associate with mathematics.   
Mathematical statements also have other types of symmetries that they satisfy. A simple example is 
symmetry of syntax. This says that a mathematical object can be described (syntax) in many different 
ways. For example we can write 6 as 2 × 3, or 2 + 2 + 2 or 54 ÷ 9. Similarly we can talk about a “non-
self-intersecting continuous loop,” “a simple closed curve,” or “a Jordan curve” and mean the same thing. 
Our point is that the results of the mathematics will be the same regardless of which syntax is used.  In 
practice mathematicians tend to use the simplest syntax possible, like “6” instead of “5+2-1”.  
Other symmetries that mathematical statements possess are so obvious and taken for granted that even 
mentioning them seems strange. For example, mathematical truths are invariant with respect to time and 
space: if they are true now then they will also be true tomorrow. If they are true in Albany they are true on 
Alpha Centauri. It is similarly immaterial if the mathematical truth is asserted by Mother Teresa or by 
Oswald Teichmüller. No one cares where, when, or in what language a theorem is stated. It is irrelevant if 
the mathematical statement was stated at all. 
With mathematics satisfying all of these different types of symmetries, it is easy to see why mathematics -
-like physics -- also has the feel of being objective, timeless, and independent of human observers. Since 
the facts of mathematics apply to many different objects, are discovered by many different individuals 
working independently, and in many different times and places, one can start believing that math is 
somehow “out there.” But, we need not make that leap. Symmetry of semantics is at the core of how we 
determine mathematical truths. Human beings function like sieves that pick and choose from among 
thoughts and ideas. We bundle the thoughts that are related by symmetry of semantics and declare such 
statements to be mathematics. We do not say that there exists some perfect mathematical truths and we 
humans find many different instances of that truth. Rather, we say that there are many different instances 
of a mathematical fact and we humans bundle them together to form a clear mathematical statement.   
See [YanZel1] and [YanZel2] for much more discussion about the nature of mathematics and how other 
issues in the philosophy of mathematics are dealt with.  
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Why mathematics works well at describing physics? 
Armed with this understanding of the nature of physics and mathematics we can tackle the question of 
why mathematics works so well at expressing physical laws. Let us look at three physical laws. 
Our first example is gravity. A description of a single instance of a perceived physical phenomenon of 
gravity might look like this: “On the second floor of 5775 Main Street in Brooklyn, New York at 
9:17:54PM, I saw an 8.46 ounce spoon fall and hit the floor 1.38 seconds later.” While it might be totally 
accurate, it is not very useful and it is not the description of all the instances of the law of gravity. As we 
explained, a law consists of all the perceived instances of that law. The only way to capture all of the 
bundled perceptions of physical phenomena of a particular law is to write it in mathematical language 
which has all its instances bundled with it. Only Newton’s formula 𝐹 = 𝐺
𝑚1𝑚2
𝑑2
 can capture the entire 
bundle of perceived physical phenomena of gravity. By substituting the mass of one body into 𝑚1and the 
mass of the other body into 𝑚2 and the distance into 𝑑, we are describing an instance of gravity.  
In a similar vein, to find the extremum of an action one needs to use the Euler–Lagrange equations: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑞
=
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝜕𝐿
𝜕?̇?
. The symmetries of an action and its local maximums or minimums can be expressed with 
these equations that are defined with the symmetry of semantics.  Of course, this can also be expressed by 
a formula that uses other variables or other symbols. By symmetry of syntax, we can even write the 
formula in Esperanto. It is irrelevant how and in what language the mathematics is expressed. As long as 
it is mathematics because only mathematics can capture the action principle in all its instances. 
The only way to truly encapsulate the relationship between pressure, volume, number of moles and 
temperature of an ideal gas is the ideal gas law:𝑃𝑉 = 𝑛𝑅𝑇. This small mathematical statement has all the 
instances of that law built into it.  
In the three examples given, all the perceived instances of the physical laws can only be expressed with 
the mathematical formula. The perceived physical phenomena that we are trying to express are all implied 
by all the instances which are inherent in the mathematical statement. In terms of symmetry, we are 
saying that the physical symmetry of applicability is a special type of the mathematical symmetry of 
semantics. In detail, for any physical law, symmetry of applicability states that the law can deal with 
swapping any appropriate object for any other appropriate object. If there is a mathematical statement that 
can describe this physical law, then we can substitute different values for the different objects that one is 
applying. In terms of bundles, we are saying that every bundle of perceived physical phenomena is a sub-
bundle of instances of the mathematical law that describes it. 
The point we are making is that mathematics works so well at describing laws of physics because they 
were both formed in the same way. The laws of physics are not living in some Platonic attic nor are the 
central ideas of mathematics. Both the physicist and the mathematician chose their statements to be 
applicable in many different contexts. We bundle perceived physical phenomena in the same way we 
bundle instances of mathematical truth.  It is not a mystery that the abstract laws of physics are stated in 
the abstract language of mathematics. Rather the regularities of phenomena and thoughts are seen and 
chosen by human beings in the same way. The fact that some of the mathematics could have been 
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formulated long before the law of physics is discovered is not so strange since they were formed with the 
same notion of symmetry.  
We have not completely solved the mystery concerning the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics. 
There are still deep questions lurking here. For one, we can ask why humans even have physics or 
mathematics. Why do we notice regularities or symmetries?  The answer is that part of being alive is 
being somewhat homeostatic, that is, living creatures must preserve themselves. The more they 
comprehend their environment, the better off they will be. Inanimate objects like sticks and stones do not 
react to their environment. In contrast, plants turn towards the sun and their roots search for water. As 
living creatures become more sophisticated they notice more about their environment. Human beings 
notice many regularities of the world around them. While chimpanzees do not seem to understand abstract 
algebra and clever dolphins do not write textbooks in quantum field theory, humans do have the ability to 
grasp the regularities of their perceived physical phenomena and the thoughts that go through their head. 
We call the regularities of our thoughts “mathematics” and some of these regularities manifest themselves 
as regularities of perceived physical phenomena, which we call “physics.” 
On the deepest level one can ask why there are any regularities at all in perceived physical phenomena? 
Why should it be that an experiment performed in Poughkeepsie will yield the same results as if it was 
performed in Piscataway? Why should balls roll down ramps at the same speed even if they are released 
at different times? Why should chemical reactions be the same when they are perceived by different 
people and in different ways? To answer such questions, we appeal to the anthropic principle. This is a 
type of reasoning that formulates answers from the very fact that we exist. If the universe did not have 
some regularities, no life would be possible. Life uses the fact that the physical universe contains some 
repeating patterns. Since there is life in the universe, there has to be certain regularities in the laws of 
physics. If the universe was totally random or like a psychedelic vision, no life ---in particular no 
intelligent human life--- would survive.  Anthropic reasoning does not eliminate the question. It tells us 
that the fact that we are here means that the universe must be a certain way, and had the universe been 
another way, we could not exist to ask the question. But the anthropic principle does not tell us why the 
universe is that way. We are still left with those deep ---and, as yet, unanswerable--- questions of “Why is 
the universe here?” “Why is there something rather than nothing?” and “What’s going on here?” 
While we have not eliminated all the mysteries, we have shown that any existing structure in our 
perceived physical universe is naturally expressed in the language of mathematics.   
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